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This paper investigates the delimiters in cosmological research which originate in the structure of 
the human knower, in particular, how the purposiveness of human actions cascades towards the 
purposiveness of cosmological research. It is not dealing with a traditional teleology, which would 
imply the study of the purposiveness of the universe’s physical evolution. It rather deals with a 
“ formal” purposiveness of cosmology related to the explicability of the universe. This explicability 
is linked to the human intentional search for the sense of its own existence in the universe, so that the 
purpose of explanation in cosmology is related to the explication of the human condition. It is argued, 
in particular, that the theoretical representations of the “universe as a whole” and “the Big Bang” (as 
the encapsulated origin of the universe) act as the telos of cosmological explanation and, hence, as 
well, as the telos of anthropological explanation related to the origin of individual persons at birth. As 
a historic-philosophical reference, the method of Kant’s Critique of Judgment is used, which is quite 
novel and unexpected in questions related to the philosophy of science.
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Introduction
In this paper we continue to investigate 
the delimiters in cosmological research which 
originate in the structure of the human knower (See: 
Nesteruk, 2012). In particular, we concentrate on 
the issue of how the purposiveness of all human 
actions cascades towards the purposiveness 
of cosmological research. Purposiveness of 
the research is not purposiveness related to the 
alleged object of this research that is the universe. 
In this sense we are not dealing with a traditional 
teleology, which would imply the assertion in the 
purposiveness of the universe’s evolution. We 
rather deal, as we could say together with Kant, 
with a “formal” purposiveness of cosmology 
which, because of the specificity of its subject 
matter, has to conduct its research under the 
assumption that there is a goal of research, the 
motivational purpose, related to the explicability 
of the universe. However, we argue here that this 
explicability originates in the human condition, 
that is in the human intentional search for the 
sense of its own existence in the universe. 
Thus the purpose of explanation in cosmology 
is related to the explication of the human 
condition. Correspondingly the purposiveness of 
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cosmological research acts as a certain delimiter 
in the explicability of the universe related to the 
human condition. 
In discussing the matters related to teleology, 
we need to start by noticing that contemporary 
natural sciences consider any sort of teleological 
explanations as inacceptable and inappropriate. 
The objections are perennial and can be 
reformulated as follows. The first one is that 
teleology is treated as if it represents the causal 
operation in the present of future events. If there 
is a process which is a subject to this teleology it 
must be purposive, that is progressing towards a 
goal, so that every event in in this process must 
be explained by reference to this goal, which 
determines the course of the whole process. 
Contemporary physics maintains it is impossible 
to understand how a future material event 
(the goal) can causally influence an event that 
precedes it. Teleology seems to be incompatible 
with the efficient physical laws which govern 
the universe of inorganic bodies. Certainly there 
remains an open question about the facticity 
of the laws of efficient causality themselves, 
namely whether these laws, being related to the 
boundary conditions of the universe (which are 
beyond space and time), are in place according 
to the transcendent goals of the universe as a 
whole. 
In contradistinction to the physical causality 
of the processes of non-living matter, the case 
of human action is understood in terms of 
consciousness and intention. In the realm of 
human affairs causality is complemented by 
intentionality. In scientific research, for example, 
scientists are aware of their purposes and aim at 
them consciously, so that their actions are caused 
not by some future events related to nature, but 
by their present awareness and the intention to 
act which they consciously form from within 
an intellectual intuition. In other words, in all 
aspects of being where consciousness is involved 
teleology is permissible as related to the intrinsic 
teleology of any human activity. 
It is teleology related to human purposive 
action that will be in the center of our interest 
in this paper. However, being concerned with 
cosmological research, there is one particular 
feature of such research activity (as “goal-
directed”) which will make the case of cosmology 
special in comparison with other purposive 
human actions which usually assume that the 
determining cause of such an action comes at 
the end. In any conscious purposive action it is 
assumed that the prevision of this “end-state” is 
characteristic of the process and is the inspiration 
to action. It is usually the case that the end-state 
of a purposive process is the goal at which the 
action is directed, so that the action is supposed 
to terminate when the goal is attained and will 
mark the end of the process in time. Cosmology 
positions itself aside from this, so to speak generic 
case, because the goal of its research is related 
to what is called the “universe as a whole”, the 
concept of which cannot be attained in any finite 
time. Correspondingly the purposive activity in 
explicating the universe is an open-ended process 
(Nesteruk, 2012), an open-ended teleology. 
Indeed, the open-endedness of purposive 
activity is obvious since cosmological research 
goes in phases of success and failure, so that 
the intermediate “end” of such a process is not 
necessarily that at which the activity aimed. The 
fulfillment or “satisfactoriness” of cosmological 
theory can have only a temporary character, so 
that the acting telos of research (as directed to the 
universe as a whole) does not cease to function 
as long as consciousness itself is in existence. In 
cosmology any research action has a conscious 
aim, often accompanied by the imagination 
of the disclosed state of the universe which 
the researcher is trying to bring about, but this 
imagined wholeness of the universe is not the 
state of affairs in which the activity is supposed 
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actually to terminate even in the case when the 
activity is successful within the stages of research. 
In fact, for a cosmologist, it is impossible to 
imagine what it would be like to attain the end 
of research at which he is aiming. One may not 
even know clearly what is that something which 
a cosmologist tries to bring about because this 
something is being brought into existence in the 
course of research in spite of the fact that this 
same research is driven by the anticipation of that 
which it wants to articulate.
Whatever awareness a cosmologist may 
have of the goal which he seeks in his purposive 
research action, this goal is not just an event or 
set of events of the ultimate disclosure of the 
universe, conceived as in the future. This goal is 
something which, by his own effort and activity, 
a cosmologist is engaged in bringing about. The 
achievement of the telos of the research and thus 
the formation of that which this research attempts 
to disclose and articulate is not conceived as 
preexisting and thus disclosed in the future without 
a cosmologist’s active participation. In a sense, 
cosmological research is dealing with its goal in 
the making, and the goal is what this activity is 
all the time generating. Cosmological research 
thus can be described as a process in which the 
outcome is all along immanent and potential, or 
through which the “final state” (the universe as a 
whole) is being generated. The purposiveness of 
such an action can be seen as a deliberate use of 
the knowledge of laws of physics in order to bring 
about desired “effects”, that is, in our case, the 
picture of the universe as a whole.
In order to appreciate the peculiar character 
of teleological activity in cosmology, if human 
purposiveness in general is taken as a model, one 
must consider the relation between the subject of 
research (the agent) and the intended objective 
pole, that is the universe as a whole (the end), 
the properties of the latter, in virtue of which 
this universe as a whole appeals to the subject 
as worthy of pursuit, that is, indeed, as that telos 
which drives cosmological research. This issue is 
closely related to the basic function of the human 
thought. The idea of the universe through the 
sense of belonging to it organizes our desires and 
directs our energies to the pursuit of theoretical 
models and their alleged physical references 
in such a manner as to attain what, through its 
activity, one anticipates as the total satisfaction 
of the enquiring person because the objects are 
consciously and persistently pursued only as 
contributing to the alleviation of the existential 
anxiety of the person. Elucidating the sense of 
the universe means to elucidate the sense of one’s 
own existence which is always encapsulated in 
any form of quest for the universe. 
It is because cosmological theories naturally 
compete and conflict even in a single researcher 
(one can recall Einstein’s blunder over the use of 
the cosmological constant), and because no single 
researcher can satisfy the criteria for “objectivity” 
of their research intentions without the assistance 
of the scientific community, that the satisfaction 
of the self of a cosmologist involves a complex 
process of organization of knowledge, which one 
usually calls education and training in which 
some kinds of scientific strategies are given up 
as incompatible with those accepted and agreed 
views of the scientific community. Finally, one 
can speak of the cosmological enquiry as a 
system of activities, or a way of life, which is 
found to be the most satisfactory, on the hand for 
purely scientific and communal reasons and, on 
the other hand, for the maintenance of personal 
existential commitments. Being placed in the 
system which involves the communal aspect of 
science and which provides for a given researcher 
the criterion by which one judges the coherence 
of research strategy and its objectives, the 
existential anxiety and objective in disclosure of 
the sense of the universe is subjected to correction 
and choice. Thus conscious purposive activity in 
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cosmology is not impelled by any simple force or 
drive towards an imagined object, nor is it drawn 
towards some single event (ultimate disclosure) 
which is supposed to occur in the future, but 
is the continuous endeavor to maintain, in a 
self-conscious personality, a dynamic system 
of research activities and satisfactions which 
are continuous with a corresponding system of 
the never-ending human enquiry into the sense 
of its own existence. One must point out that 
the “object” (the universe as a whole) which 
research activities pursue are satisfactory only to 
the extent that they maintain the system which 
does not frustrate existence. Correspondingly 
the pursuit of knowledge of the universe as a 
whole is chosen for the purpose of maintaining 
the sense of life and this qualifies as conscious 
purposive action. It is, therefore, the property of 
the universe to be a special sort of the whole of life 
which renders the objects of conscious purposive 
action, that is cosmological research satisfactory. 
Then the aims of such action are not “ends” in 
the temporal sense of finality, because the real 
and ultimate aim is the persistent maintenance of 
the system of enquiry into the sense of existence. 
Correspondingly cosmological enquiry is not 
simply a linear process which aims to terminate in 
a state of satisfied rest, but a continuous activity, 
all of which is intrinsic to the satisfactory state of 
consciousness of those who enquire in the sense 
of existence. Hence the cosmological quest is at 
one and the same time both means and end. And 
thus is our main thesis: there is a teleology of 
explication in cosmology which drives research 
but which has an existential origin, related 
to the purposiveness of any human action, in 
particular, to the desire to explicate the sense of 
existence. But this teleology, de facto, determines 
the strategy of cosmological research and thus 
acts as a delimiter relating the extent in the 
unconcealment of the universe to the parameters 
of the human existence.
To assign to the thus outlined view of 
teleology in cosmological research a more 
rigorous philosophical status, we turn, as a 
matter of a historical philosophical reference, to 
some classical writings of Kant on the paradigm 
of teleology as contraposed to that of causal 
physical explanation. The aim of this reference is 
to invoke Kant’s argument for the demonstration 
that the prevailing mathematical physics’ trend 
in cosmological research implicitly contains its 
own teleology so that the teleology of research 
not only does not contradict the mechanistic-
like approach to the study of the universe, on 
the contrary it is this teleology which ordains 
physic-mathematical study of the universe. The 
methodology of research, which implicitly drives 
cosmologists to the disclosure of the universe, 
contains teleology as its inevitable component 
related simply to the purposiveness of any human 
actions. 
It is known that Kant in his investigation 
of teleology in his Critique of Judgement made 
a shift in emphasis away from metaphysical 
aspects of the study of nature in the direction of 
the methodology of this study. It was no longer a 
question of the way the world is, but of what it is 
possible for us to know and to understand. The 
phenomenal world is not given all at once, but 
unfolds as we investigate it. One particular aspect 
of scientific methodology which was promoted 
by Kant and which we want to explicate here, in 
the context of cosmology, is the purposiveness of 
cosmological research which implies (in spite of 
all attempts in modern scientific enquiry of the 
universe to get away from teleology as related 
to the final causes of the universe) that teleology 
is intrinsically preserved, not in respect to the 
material references of cosmological theory, but in 
respect to the very way the cosmological enquiry 
works, that is as how teleology pertains to the 
essence of human enquiry into the nature of the 
universe, but also into the nature of human beings 
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themselves. To make the explication aimed at, one 
needs to relate cosmological ideas not to Kant’s 
views on the scientific systems as they were 
presented in his first Critique and other treatises 
on the natural sciences, but, and this is novel and 
unexpected, to his Critique of Judgement.1 
Before Kant published his Critique of 
Judgment in 1790, his writings on science, 
including the Critique of Pure Reason and 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 
were concerned with the logic and structure of 
scientific systems, as well as their justification. 
Kant believed that the ideal model of scientific 
knowledge was the Newtonian physics, so that, 
in general, the only legitimate explanations 
of natural phenomena can be provided by 
mathematical physics. It is in the first Critique 
that Kant formulated the general methodological 
presuppositions of the possible scientific 
system of knowledge. However, it is only in the 
Critique of Judgment that he approached science 
differently, observing it not as an accomplished 
system, but as a research program and strategy, 
as a mode of human activity. The motive of 
Kant’s enquiry was the question of the limits of 
scientific investigation which could follow from 
setting of scientific process in the context of the 
human historically contingent condition. Prior 
to this, Kant had already given some responses 
to this question in his epistemology of science 
asserting that scientific investigation is limited 
to study of the phenomenal world, whose objects 
are to be located in space and time and subjected 
to the categories of the understanding. Since our 
interest lies in cosmology and we are concerned 
with its alleged “object”, the universe as a whole, 
one can easily grasp that cosmology deviates from 
that pattern of explanation which was prescribed 
by Kant on the basis of the Newtonian physics. 
Kant’s epistemological prescription, related to 
space and time, as well as to the exhaustion of 
the object through categories, cannot work in 
cosmology and Kant himself placed the enquiry 
on the wholeness of the world in the context of 
his cosmological antinomies of reason which 
explicate the limits of discursive thinking (as well 
as to cognitive faculties in general). Nevertheless 
one wonders whether there are any features, 
related to our structure as human knowers such 
that, in spite of constraining the ways and scope 
of our investigation of the universe, they allow 
the justification of research strategies of present 
cosmological theories which pretend to understand 
the universe as a whole. To answer this question it 
seems reasonable to refer to some ideas of Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment dealing with teleology in 
understanding nature; for we believe that it is 
the underlying teleological propensity of human 
subjectivity which allows it to assert the universe 
as a whole not as a metaphor or as a limiting pole 
in human understanding, but as that intrinsic 
existential telos which encourages humanity 
for self-understanding in the background of its 
ambivalent position in the universe. However, 
before we turn to a more detailed employment of 
Kant’s ideas, one may, as an example, give a hint 
of how teleology of cosmological explanation 
revealed itself in a methodological move which, 
by its historical and methodological essence was 
anti-teleological.
Cosmological principle  
and explicability of the universe
The universe as space-time continuum 
is linked, according to general relativity, to 
the distribution of matter. Since we cannot 
empirically verify the statistics of distribution 
of matter from other locations in space, we have 
to speculate on its overall distribution in the 
universe appealing to non-physical and non-
testable assumptions. The universe seems to 
be isotropic from what we see in the sky if the 
scale corresponds to the clusters of galaxies. 
This isotropy, as an empirical observation, is a 
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contingent fact linked to the specificity of our 
location in space.2 The fact that the universe 
looks isotropic from our earthly position does 
not entail that the universe should look isotropic 
from every possible location in the universe. 
However, if one assumes that it is only from our 
position that the universe looks isotropic (but not 
from others), this assumption carries with itself a 
suspicion in a kind of teleology, namely that our 
position in the universe is somehow biased, or 
intentionally adjusted in order for us to observe 
the universe as isotropic. In order to remove this 
teleological flavour, cosmology postulates that 
the observed isotropy of the universe must be 
extended to all possible locations and this entails 
that the universe is uniform, that is homogeneous 
in space. The cosmological principle represents 
a refined version of the hypothesis of a formal 
interchange of home-places having a counterpart 
in physical reality related to a particular 
geometrical aspect of what as a phenomenon is 
given to human consciousness on Earth. If the 
cosmological principle is valid all enquiry into 
our absolute position as observers in space looses 
any sense because all locations in space become 
equivalent: the symmetry of space entails the 
loss of information of the absolute position in it. 
As sometimes said, humanity’s position in the 
universe becomes indifferent, or mediocre. 
The idea of our indifferent position in 
space, which, as is known, was inaugurated by 
Copernicus3 in the context of a solar system and 
taken by Bruno (through a theological argument4) 
to a sort of extreme, was a prevalent trend after 
the scientific revolutions of the 17th century, 
so that modern cosmologists, as inheritors of 
the same desire to mathematize nature and to 
subordinate it to the laws of physics, felt obliged 
to apply the same principle to the large-scale 
structure of the universe whose elementary 
constituent – cluster of galaxies – became 
available to observations only in the 20th century. 
Thus most contemporary cosmological theories 
contain, as their basic ingredient, the so called 
“cosmological principle” (sometimes phrased as 
the indifference principle) which postulates the 
uniform distribution of matter in the universe 
and, as its consequence, the uniformity of space 
in the universe.5 Here one note that the principle 
which advocates the mediocrity or indifference 
in the position of humanity in the cosmos (that is, 
historically, incorrectly associated with the name 
of Copernicus whose intention was not to displace 
humanity from its centre) must be understood not 
simply as a cosmographic ad hoc statement, but 
in terms of that which this principle effectively 
rejects, that is the teleological assumptions about 
the biased, selected position of humanity in 
being, including its special cosmographic place 
(See McMullin, 1993, p. 373).
It is not difficult to understand that only 
under this assumption (namely the cosmological 
principle), is any scientific methodology of 
studying the universe as a whole in cosmology 
(not stars, galaxies etc. in astronomy and 
astrophysics) possible. Indeed the uniformity of 
the universe is needed in order to predicate its 
properties in terms of the same physical laws in 
locations which are fundamentally inaccessible 
to our reach (nomological uniformity). The 
integrity of our intelligence must correspond to 
the integrity of the cosmos, and this integrity 
is best expressed in terms of its uniformity. 
The global picture of the universe would not 
be possible if in every corner of it physical 
laws were to be different and the amount of all 
distinct objects or phenomena infinitely varied. 
The inexplicability of the universe would follow 
simply from incommensurability of the universe 
with our finite rationality. Indeed, astronomers 
claim that the amount of distinct objects in the 
sky is finite (Harwit, 1984) and some guess 
that their finitude is linked to the given “finite” 
cognitive faculties, whose “finitude” cascades 
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down to the integrity of the human picture of the 
universe (McLaughlin, 1985). The cosmological 
principle, by postulating the uniformity of the 
universe reduces the number of parameters 
of its description (related to the large- scale 
structure) to a minimum which corresponds to 
the human ability to explicate the universe as 
a whole. This description is generic, so that all 
contingencies of objects and aspects of space-
time are eliminated from theory in order to avoid 
a problem with the infinite number of contingent 
outcomes of the physical laws. The physical law 
in this case means the postulate of a generic 
symmetry such that all concrete objects become 
indistinguishable. But, once again, it is only this 
description which makes possible any form of 
speech of the universe as a whole. The contingent 
facticity of various objects in the universe is 
replaced by the undifferentiated substance 
called the “cosmological perfect fluid” (related 
to clusters of galaxies and characterised by two 
macroscopic parameters – density and pressure) 
6. The “cosmological principle” implied in the 
specific form of equations for matter distribution 
in the universe provides a cosmologist with a 
necessary physic-mathematic tool, describing 
the universe in terms of the efficient causality of 
the laws of general relativity. However, one must 
remember that this efficient causality is ordained 
through the anti-teleological cosmological 
principle of the universe’s explicability, the 
principle which, as such, is related to “another 
teleology”, namely to the purposiveness of 
cosmological research. To amplify the latter 
point one must understand that the introduction 
of the cosmological principle, being de facto 
a different way of formulating the contingent 
facticity of what is observed (the contingent 
facticity of a potentially infinite number of 
objects is transferred to the contingent facticity 
of the generic symmetry), does not explain the 
contingent facticity itself: as such it does not 
explain why the universe is uniform. We need 
uniformity of the universe as a principle of its 
explication, but this demand for the uniformity 
comes from human researchers in cosmology, 
who realise the purposiveness of their actions in 
explication of the universe through the postulate 
of the cosmological principle. Thus, being anti-
teleological in its initial intentions, this principle 
remains teleological, but on a different level, 
that is on the level of epistemology. 
One must notice that the “cosmological 
principle” changes our perception of the 
contingency of our spatial position in the 
universe. If the universe is uniform in terms of 
matter and space this implies that it looks similar 
from all possible locations (assuming that there 
can potentially be observers in these locations). 
This evidently diminishes any insistence on the 
special spatial contingency of humanity in the 
universe: we could be anywhere and observe 
the same. This means that the fragment of the 
universe which is visible to us, while being 
limited in its particular image from our vantage 
point, makes a fair representation of that which 
is possible at all. However, one must remember 
that the actual observability and the possibility of 
theoretical explication of the universe as a whole 
requires more than the uniformity of the universe 
formulated at the level of clusters of galaxies. 
One expects that the conditions for existence 
of life in one particular galaxy and particular 
planetary systems are much more sophisticated 
and are controlled by cosmology only on the 
level of necessary conditions. The explication 
of the actual appearance of life on Earth and 
human conscious beings requires an appeal to 
a different type of explanation, not only in the 
realm of physics. Indeed, since life on our planet 
is now dependent on and controlled by socio-
economical as well as ethical factors, which are 
secondary with respect to the natural conditions, 
the continuation of life requires a certain spiritual 
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commitment (as humanity’s telos).7 Then the 
explication of the universe intrinsically contains 
the elements of the acting telos of explication 
of life itself: the purpose of understanding the 
universe lies within the purpose of understanding 
life, and vice versa. 
As we have seen, the cosmological principle 
was introduced in modern cosmology as an “anti-
teleological” move which fights teleology on 
the level of material poles, nexus finalis, in the 
universe. The universe as such is stripped off 
of any purposiveness, any intention behind its 
structure, any design founded in extramundane 
reasons. However one cannot say that teleology is 
removed from cosmological research completely. 
The very treatment of the cosmological principle 
as a transcendental principle, as a principle of 
explicability, inserts teleology back as formal 
purposiveness of research as such. Indeed, the 
purpose of cosmology is to explicate the sense 
of the universe. This purpose originates in the 
innate urges of human beings to understand 
their place in the universe and, in general, to 
understand the sense of human existence as such. 
In this sense the purpose of research is directly 
implanted into the purposiveness of all human 
actions. Then the purpose of cosmology, that is 
to explicate the universe, becomes a particular 
manifestation of the existential telos of humanity. 
But, to explicate the universe one needs the 
cosmological principle, which effectively replaces 
the alleged purposiveness of the material universe 
by the formal purposiveness of cosmological 
explanation. 
Correspondingly the centrality of human 
beings in the universe being deprived of its 
absolute cosmographic sense, is reinstated to 
the centrality of disclosure and manifestation of 
the universe through rationality. Human beings 
are still in the centre of the universe because the 
universe becomes palpable and self-conscious 
through human beings who live in a particular 
period of cosmic evolution when the large-
scale structure of the universe is accessible 
to observation and explication.8 Claiming the 
centrality of the universe in this sense does not 
mean that we imply that the universe was created 
with the purpose of our coming into being or 
that it evolved bearing us in mind. What we say 
is that the universe supports us and this is a fact 
inherent in physical laws, not in any particular 
“conscious will” of the universe itself. On purely 
physical grounds it seems improbable that such 
physical agencies in the universe as dark matter 
intentionally organised its forces over billions of 
years in order to pull atoms together in galaxies, 
containing stars and ultimately us. The balance 
of cosmic forces did not cradle our galaxy and 
the Solar system for the benefit of our arrival 
through biological evolution. Probably, if physics 
is right the universe had to be exactly that which 
it is now according to physical laws. Certainly 
the facticity of this physics is an even greater 
mystery related to the boundary conditions 
which are not controlled by physics itself. In this 
sense, if one refuses to appeal to the questions 
of the purposiveness of creation of the universe 
through special initial (or boundary) conditions, 
one has to admit that the only efficacious telos of 
the universe is its explicability by human beings 
for whom the purposiveness is implanted in any 
practical actions. If then the aim of cosmology is 
to attempt to understand the contingent facticity 
of the universe, and through this the contingent 
facticity of life itself, this aim, referred in 
cosmological research to the initial (boundary) 
conditions of the universe, becomes teleological 
per se. Correspondingly the past of the universe 
as that “grandfather” or “grandmother” of 
humanity receives a different meaning: it is not 
only knowledge of this past which matters, but 
most of all the spiritual leap to this past as respect 
for that which constitutes an inherent teleology 
of human life. 
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Purposiveness in scientific research  
and cosmology
In general, any strategy of scientific research 
aspires to have a guarantee that the patterns of 
its enquiry will provide satisfactory answers 
to its questions. Applied to the wholeness of 
the universe, this aspiration is frustrated by 
recognising that the universe appears as an 
aggregate of contingent laws which apply across 
the universe, but the origin of these laws, which 
is attributed to the boundary conditions in the 
universe are beyond human comprehension. Even 
if we grant, along the line of Kant’s thinking, 
that there are synthetic universal and necessary 
principles that are employed in our enquiry of 
nature, it does not follow that any particular 
discovered natural law is also synthetic and a 
priori, and therefore, universal and necessary: it 
can be the case that these laws are active only in 
that part of the universe where we live. For Kant 
all natural laws, although some of them are in a 
restricted sense «necessary», are synthetic and a 
posteriori, which means that although they are 
indeed the laws in the universe, it is logically and 
conceptually possible that the universe as a whole 
might have been governed by quite different laws. 
The framework of scientific cosmology implies 
that the universe must be coherent with the 
categories of the understanding, but it does not 
tell us in advance of how and along which ways 
this could be discovered. To know in advance 
that the universe must be exactly that which is 
actually discovered would involve a human 
subject in the impossible kind of intuition of 
the universe as a whole which recalls a mystical 
communion. Expressed in modern terms, based 
on the understanding that scientific synthesis 
rooted in mathematical physics presupposes 
computational synthesis, this assumption would 
be tantamount to the possibility of an infinite 
computational synthesis which is impossible 
because of the finitude of human embodiment. In 
Heideggerian language, the foreknowledge of the 
whole universe would imply the completion of the 
unconcealment of the universe and removal of all 
delimiters in its knowledge related to humanity as 
a measure of this unconcealment (Heidegger 1991, 
pp. 91-95). In other words, humanity must have 
been considered in this case as commensurable to 
the universe as a whole, which is philosophically 
a weak point. Correspondingly in Kantian terms, 
the intuition of the universe as a whole would 
amount to divine foreknowledge; but critical 
philosophy was rigorously opposed to any claim 
for the possibility of mimicking this god’s-eye 
view of the universe. 
The brute empirical fact is that we 
continually encounter items in experience that 
cannot be fully understood, and for which no 
theoretical concepts are at hand. In cosmology this 
situation is particularly manifest in its assertion 
that ninety six percent of the material content 
of the universe is described by the so called 
dark matter and dark energy; the observations, 
to fit into theory, demand one to postulate their 
existence. However, what these dark components 
of the universe are nobody knows at this stage, 
for there is no experimentally evidenced carriers 
of these two types of matter. In this sense, both 
these components of the universe represent 
such particulars whose theoretical generation 
and structure cannot be fully understood with 
reference to mechanical principles based on the 
patterns of efficient causality simply because this 
very causality, exercised at the theoretical level, 
cannot be applied to all things which are in the 
realm of experience. However, the contemporary 
model of the universe operates with these 
notions of dark matter and energy as if they were 
determinate from their concepts on the level of 
material causes. Unfortunately this is not the 
case, and in spite of any realistic commitments 
with respect to these notions they still remain 
those particulars for the understanding of 
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which we require judgment. The same is true 
for the concept of the universe as a whole (in 
spite of the fact that to think of the universe as 
a particular seems to be strange). The universe 
as a whole cannot be a subject of theoretical 
knowledge restricted to the schematism of the 
forms of sensibility and the understanding. The 
notion of the universe as a whole represents such 
a “particular” which escapes any determination 
on the grounds of mechanistic-like causality 
because by its definition the universe is beyond 
any relationality based on worldly causality. 
In its sheer givenness to us, the universe is an 
escaping, irregular “particular”, which demands 
from us an exercise of a faculty of judgement in 
order to attempt to understand it. In this sense 
the exercising of judgment with respect to the 
universe ultimately vindicates the very enterprise 
of the physical cosmology: to initiate the process 
of the study of the universe (based in the faculties 
of reason) we need to have prior judgment of it. 
The fact that the universe as a whole falls 
under the rubric of an irregular “particular” 
follows from the very definition that the universe 
as a whole cannot be in the chain of causality 
which we usually ascribe to its visible part. Here 
is the essence of Kant’s critique of the concept 
of the world. In this respect the universe is 
freely generated by escaping all transcendental 
delimiters, and what it turns out to be could have 
been otherwise: the universe is presented to us in 
its contingent facticity.
It is worth making some terminological 
clarifications in order to elucidate the meaning of 
that which is meant by the phrase “judgement of 
the universe.” Kant defines the faculty of judgment 
as “the faculty of thinking the particular as 
contained under the universal” (CJ, Introduction, 
IV, p. 15). The faculty of judgement with respect 
to a given particular which is to be thought as 
included in a general rule, principle or law can 
be determining or reflective. Any judgment that 
includes an individual or event in the rule, or under 
a categorical scheme, is determining. This is true 
of any judgment that subsumes a particular under 
a given law or concept as principles (CJ, § 69, p. 
232). If the universal rule, principle, or law be 
given, the judgment which includes the particular 
under it is determining.9 In contradistinction to 
that latter, the reflective judgement is to subsume 
the particular under a law (the universal) which 
has to be found (CJ, § 69, p. 232; Introduction, 
IV, p. 15). 
Reflective judgments seek to subsume 
particulars under laws which are not yet known, 
and thus can be thought of as principles which 
are formulated from themselves. It is because this 
judgement is not objective (as one would say not 
related through certain rules to empirical reality), 
it acts as a subjective principle for the purposive 
employment of our cognitive faculties, that is 
for reflecting upon objects (CJ, § 69, p. 232). 
The reflective faculty of judgement attempts 
to find a concept for the manifold of empirical 
data by means of which this is not represented 
in a discursive unity of an objective concept, 
but by means of how it appears in the form of a 
systematic unity of a whole organised according to 
the representation of a purpose. Such systematic 
unity is characteristic for the notion of the universe 
as a whole containing objects and laws which are 
supposed to fit in a logical system. The same can 
be made more precise by saying that the reflective 
faculty of judgement subsumes the representation 
of a particular (empirical aspects of the universe) 
under the representation of the universal, that is 
the universe as a whole, in spite of the fact that 
this universal is not given. Correspondingly it 
is because no universal is given to the reflective 
faculty of judgement related to the totality of the 
universe (or the Big Bang as an encapsulated 
initial condition of such a totality), that the task of 
this faculty is to reflect on a given representation 
of the universe (in it pieces and moments) and 
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to produce a possible concept (FICJ V (211), 
p.16), that is “to compare and combine given 
representation either with other representations” 
(that is to provide a coherent picture which 
unites different empirical representations of the 
visible cosmos), “or with one’s cognitive powers, 
with respect to a concept which is thereby made 
possible” (FICJ V, 211, p. 16) (the cognitive 
faculty of the unity of consciousness which is 
capable of integrating the variety of empirical 
data under a conceptual symbol of the totality 
of all in all). The purposive employment of 
human cognitive functions is manifested either 
through achieving systematic unity through the 
coherence of explanation, or through establishing 
the relationship of all aspects of the universe to 
the unity of subjectivity. 
Determining judgments are thus objective 
and are ultimately based upon a priori principles. 
Reflective judgments apply maxims which for 
Kant are always subjective and are only to be 
employed regulatively (CPuR, A666-68/B694-
96). According to Kant’s definition: “I entitle 
all subjective principles which are derived, 
not from the constitution of an object but from 
the interest of reason in respect of a certain 
possible perfection of the knowledge of the 
object, maxims of reason” (CPuR, A666/B694, 
p. 547) (emphasis is added). These maxims, in 
modern terms and in the context of our interest, 
articulate the research strategies deployed in 
order to understand the universe as expressed in 
its empirical laws (CJ, § 69, pp. 232-33). Kant’s 
insistence that the maxims are subjective can 
be nowadays qualified as “intersubjective”, 
or “collective” as related to the community of 
cosmologists. It is the community of cosmologists 
which determines what maxim, or methodology, 
to use in order to fit the variety of data in a 
reasonable theory, or alternatively adopts the 
criteria for reality of that which stands behind 
abstract mathematical theories, in particular, in 
those cases when the principle of correspondence 
with empirical reality does not work and one 
appeals, for example, to coherence arguments.10 
This happens, as an example, in the cosmology 
of the early universe when cosmologists choose 
as a maxim (that is a research strategy) the model 
of the so called inflationary universe on the basis 
of a possible resolution of some predicaments of 
classical cosmology.11 Being a theoretical model 
of the remote past of the universe, inflationary 
cosmology cannot be tested empirically, so that 
its adoption as a strategy of theoretical research 
has a precarious status deeply based in a 
belief-motivated commitment supported by the 
collective opinion.12 Thus inflationary cosmology 
functions in the conditions of a reflective 
judgement imbued with the purposiveness of 
explanation of the variety of astronomical facts 
as well as resolution of meta-empirical puzzles.13 
In addition one can mention another purposive 
dimension of inflationary cosmologies, namely 
the desire to address the issue of generic initial 
conditions of the universe, whose specialness 
(according to classical cosmology) points 
towards a fundamental contingency of the 
observable universe. It is by means of this 
“inflationary maxim” that cosmology reflectively 
seeks a knowledge of the kinds of theoretically 
expressed laws which can be used for the purpose 
of conceptual management of those particulars 
(three predicaments mentioned above, which are 
not part of empirical research) which as such 
escape the rubrics of efficient causality available 
to pre-inflationary cosmology. Correspondingly, 
reflective judgment on the unity and integrity of 
the visible universe, based on an intersubjective 
maxim (methodology), is neither true nor 
false, not even probable or improbable. Such 
a judgement is rather a rational estimate of 
the way the universe operates, and expresses 
a normative research strategy to render the 
universe explicable. The purposiveness of the 
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strategy implied in this judgement is related to 
the demand for explicability. 
If one follows Kant, one must think of two 
major research strategies or maxims of reflective 
judgment which can be applied in cosmology: 
1] The maxim of mechanism: “All production 
of material things and their forms must be judged 
to be possible according to merely mechanical 
laws” (CJ, § 70, p. 234). In other words, all 
aspects of the universe, including its alleged 
wholeness must be described by using physical 
laws established by earthly physics, so that the 
comprehension of the universe as a whole can 
be established by means of ascending through 
the empirical set of causations in the visible 
universe; 
2] The maxim of teleology: “Some products 
of material nature [universe, AN] cannot be 
judged to be possible according to merely 
mechanical laws (To judge them requires quite 
a different law of causality, namely, that of final 
causes)” (Ibid). It is problematic to think of the 
universe as a whole as being subjected to physical 
laws, for these laws act across the universe, 
being perhaps the manifestations of its boundary 
conditions. In this sense if one enquires into the 
contingent facticity of the universe as a whole 
and its laws, one has to appeal to another type of 
“causality”, that is causality as origination (not in 
a temporal sense) from some foundation, which 
itself is not part of that which is subjected to this 
alleged causality. 
Correspondingly, in accordance with Kant, 
if we apply these maxims of judgement in respect 
of knowledge of the universe in cosmology, it 
becomes quite clear that the maxims cannot be 
formulated and treated as constitutive claims 
about the universe. The inflationary model 
remains only a model! The conflict between which 
is expressed by the propositions “the production 
of the universe is possible on mere mechanical 
laws” and “the production of the universe is not 
possible on mere mechanical laws” is irresolvable 
because there is no a priori way of determining the 
possibility of the production of the universe only 
through the empirical laws of nature: the universe 
cannot be rerun in the laboratory. Instead, the 
maxims express two different research strategies, 
that is the ways of studying the universe, which 
are, as we argue, not only non-incompatible, but, 
in fact, are both intrinsically unavoidable in order 
to sustain the wholeness of research. 
Indeed, on the one hand, in view of Kant, 
unless the principle of mechanistic explanation 
is applied “…there can be no proper knowledge 
of nature at all” (CJ, § 70, p. 234). In accordance 
with this, in cosmology, one must push the 
investigation of the universe along the lines of 
mechanistic explanation (that is, the explanation 
based on causal physical laws) as far as possible. 
In our empirical investigation of the universe 
as causally connected, we should proceed in 
terms of the universe’s purely causal physical 
laws as far as we can, for in these laws lie the 
true grounds for a physical explanation of 
the universe, which constitutes that scientific 
knowledge of the universe which we exercise 
through reason. According to Kant the efficient 
causality whose necessity was demonstrated 
in the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure 
Reason authorizes every event. 
However, the universe as a whole is not 
an object of possible experience and it cannot 
be labelled by the term “event” in the sense of 
an ordinary happening in space and time; one 
cannot know anything about the ultimate causal 
features related to the universe as a whole (the 
antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason 
accentuate this point). We find that the universe 
as a whole (in contradistinction with the finite 
products of nature) represents what Kant would 
call “genera”, in which the efficient causes acting 
upon the universe and giving it coherence and 
integrity, are contemplated by us (through study 
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of the universe’s constituents) as based on the 
concept of a purpose, if we want to experience the 
universe in terms of a principle appropriate to its 
inner possibility. Suppose that we tried to judge 
the universe’s form and its possibility merely in 
terms of mechanical laws, where it is not the idea 
of the effect which is regarded as the basis that 
makes the possible cause of this effect, but the 
other way round, that is the cause is regarded as 
the basis that makes the effect possible. If we tried 
this, we could not acquire (regarding the specific 
form of the universe) any empirical concept that 
would enable us to establish the transition from 
cause to the effect. For the effect we see in the 
universe as a whole is caused by its parts not 
insofar as each part on its own contains a separate 
basis, but only insofar as all of them together 
contain a joint basis (related to the whole of the 
universe) making these parts of the universe 
possible. But it seems to be quite contrary to the 
nature of physic-mechanical causality that the 
whole should be the cause that makes possible 
the causality of the parts; rather, here the parts 
must be given first in order for us to grasp from 
them the possibility of a whole. Further to this 
one can assert that the presentation of a whole as 
preceding the possibility of its parts functions as 
a mere idea; and when this idea is regarded as the 
basis of the causality it is called a purpose. Then 
one can conclude that in the case of the universe 
as a whole we cannot investigate its character 
and its cause as given in experience (that is 
explained by reason) without presenting it, its 
form and its “causality”, as determined according 
to a principle of purpose. But the employment of 
the maxim of teleology in cosmology does not 
eliminate or replaces the maxim of mechanistic 
explanation, it just demonstrates that in some 
cases the maxim of mechanism cannot be 
straightforwardly applied. This happens in the 
case of the universe as a whole whose idea acts 
as a telos of cosmological explanation initiating 
de facto all particular models which are based 
on the efficient physical causality. The universe 
itself can only be understood as meaningful in its 
integrity if it is seen as being “produced” for the 
purpose of its explicability by human beings. 
“The universe as a whole” as telos  
of cosmological explanation
The implementation of the maxim of 
teleology does not imply that it constitutes an 
objective pole of that which could correspond 
to the notion of the universe as a whole. Rather 
the maxim of teleology outlines the strategy of 
research as the explicability of the universe. For 
example, to understand the universe we need to 
find such a unified description of it in a minimal 
set of physical laws related to its initial or 
boundary conditions, so that this ideal description 
will act as the telos of cosmological research. The 
idea of the Big Bang in this case appears to be 
exactly the telos of explanation, the telos which is 
paradoxically referred to the physical past of the 
universe, and not its future. 
In anticipation of a possible scepticism or 
objection to this conclusion, which could arise 
from the camp of cosmologists, one could make 
a general comment that teleology operates as an 
a priori presupposition in any scientific enquiry: 
this teleology is related to the goal of scientific 
explanation, its objective to disclose nature 
along the ways humanity is capable of doing so, 
in order to understand humanity’s own “end”, a 
“purpose” of its presence in the universe. In this 
sense, if teleology is implicitly present in the 
foundation of any scientific enquiry, it naturally 
subordinates mechanistic explanation (“ordains” 
this explanation) as the way to achieving the 
goal of this explanation, the goal which, as such, 
transcends all possible particular mechanistic 
explanations. Hence it is teleology, as the principle 
of purposiveness of research, that vindicates the 
usage of the mechanistic trend in cosmology’s 
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attempts to deal with the universe as a whole in 
spite of clear understanding that this mechanistic 
trend will never be able to accomplish the goal for 
which it is used. It is because we must necessarily 
think of the universe as having purpose to be 
explicable by us that we are justified in applying 
the principle of causal efficiency to its visible parts. 
In a characteristic way teleology of explanation 
in cosmology functions as a transcendental 
principle, as a demand for the universe’s 
explicability which cascades down towards some 
particular theoretical requirements, such as, for 
example, the cosmological principle, that is the 
uniformity of the universe in terms of space and 
matter, which receives its specific incarnation 
in the mathematical formalism enabling the 
universe’s explication.
Now, it is clear that the concept of a 
purposiveness of the universe implied by the 
teleology of cosmological explanation serves us 
merely for reflecting on that which we would 
like to treat as an object, not for determining the 
object through the concept of a purpose, and that 
the teleological judgment about the possibility 
of contingent production of all possible objects 
in the universe is a merely reflective and not a 
determinative judgment. What we say is that our 
thought, in producing a concept of the universe as 
a whole, includes the thought of the “presentation 
of a purpose” (that is the universe as a whole 
as a material pole), because this thought serves 
us as a principle by which we can guide our 
investigation of the universe as a physical entity, 
and also because thinking the presentation of a 
purpose here might help us devise theoretical 
and experimental means to further the effect 
of the anticipation of the universe. However, 
expressing ourselves this way we do not attribute 
to the universe a cause that acts in terms of the 
presentation of purposes, that is in terms of some 
material pole. If we did so, we would be making 
a determinative teleological judgment which 
would be a transcendent judgment, since it would 
suggest a causality that lies beyond the bounds 
of nature.
Using a teleological principle of explanation 
of inner possibility of the universe as a whole, we 
leave undetermined whether the purposiveness 
of the universe implies or does not imply any 
transcendent intentionality. If a judgment asserted 
either of these alternatives it would no longer be 
merely reflective but would be determinative; 
and the concept of a purpose would no longer 
be a mere concept of the power of judgment, but 
would be connected with a concept of reason, that 
is the concept of a cause that we posit beyond the 
universe and which acts intentionally, whether we 
are in this case judging affirmatively or negatively. 
For example, if we imply this purposiveness as 
related to the intrinsic property of the universe 
which we do not experience, so that the purpose 
becomes, in Kantian parlance, a thing in itself, 
then this purpose is not a constitutive concept of 
understanding or of reason, but it can function as 
a regulative concept for the reflective judgment. 
If the universe, as an object of our teleological 
judgment, is to be thought of as employing 
reason, so that reason produces the concept of a 
purpose, this would be something more than we 
could expect from judgment. All that judgment 
can do, as a separate cognitive faculty, is to 
consider the relation in which two faculties, that 
is imagination and the understanding, are related 
in a representation prior to the emergence of 
any concept, thereby perceiving the subjective 
purposiveness of the universe relative to its 
apprehension by the cognitive faculties. Hence, 
while judgment can indeed have a priori principles 
for the form of intuition, yet it cannot have 
a-priori principle for the concepts concerning 
the production of things, and so the concept of 
a real purpose of the universe, or its end in a 
physical sense, lies completely beyond the realm 
of the faculty of judgment. If in dealing with the 
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teleological purposiveness of the universe, this 
purposiveness is presented through concepts, 
judgment will have to put the understanding 
(applicable to the realm of experience, that is 
visible universe) in a relation to reason, which, 
in fact, delimits the understanding, thus making 
impossible any speculations on the universe as 
natural purpose. If the universe is treated as a 
concept, that is as a rational idea, it is subject to 
the Kant’s first Critique, and thus can function 
only as a regulative concept for the reflective 
judgment, to guide our investigation about the 
universe as a whole by a distant analogy with our 
own causality according to purposes and in our 
meditations upon the universe’s ultimate ground.
It is true that the concept of purposes and of 
purposiveness can be a concept of reason in the 
case we attribute to reason the basis that makes an 
object possible according to the implied purpose. 
In products of art we can become conscious of 
reason’s causality as giving rise to objects, which 
are therefore called purposive or purposes. But 
the analogy with art is very limited, because 
the concept of the purposiveness of the universe 
relates reason, as cause, to things (the universe) 
where no experience informs us that reason is 
the basis that makes them possible. To attribute 
purposiveness and purposes to the universe is to 
use a concept, whose correlate cannot be found in 
experience. The concept of purpose is employed 
by judgment only for reflecting with its help upon 
objects, so that, in the experience of disjoined 
appearances and objects we are directed to the 
possibility of uniting them in a system. This is 
the reason why we talk here about the teleology 
of explanation of the universe, and not teleology 
of the universe as its natural end. 
Indeed, the idea of a telos of scientific 
explanation comes through the reference to 
our own purposive behaviour in art, poetry 
and in practical matters: it is there that we can 
reasonably claim that effects of the activity 
are also its causes, that is those purpose-based 
projects which brought the effects into being. For 
example, if the purpose is to produce a painting 
of a landscape, correspondingly the effect is a 
particular reflection of the surrounding nature 
in a piece of art. This piece of art is an effect 
caused by the purpose to produce the image 
of the landscape, but the effect here becomes, 
through the telos set up at the beginning, the 
telos of producing an image of the landscape. 
In cosmology the situation is similar in that a 
cosmological theory can be considered as an effect 
caused by the purpose to produce the “landscape” 
of the universe, so that the effect becomes through 
the telos of explanation set up at the beginning. 
The difference is that the desired “landscape” of 
the universe cannot be accomplished, so that the 
effect of the cause is an ongoing intertwining with 
this cause. Correspondingly the representation of 
the universe as a whole14, being a cause for the 
unfolding theoretical explication of the universe, 
according to Kant’s definition, forms a purpose: 
“…the product of a cause whose determining 
ground is merely the representation of its effect 
is called a purpose” (CJ, § 77, p. 256). But this 
purpose is itself being constituted through the 
fact that it is not something preconceived and is 
always in the making through the research which 
is launched by this very purpose. Since it is 
understood that this purpose cannot be achieved 
as material knowledge, the question is as to how 
one can conceptualize “purposes” of cosmological 
explanation as fundamentally distinct from 
purposes related to technical, artistic, or practical 
contexts.
The representation of “the universe as 
a whole” is fit for judgment as a purpose of 
explanation because it satisfies the following 
condition: the representation of its existence 
and form of its parts must be possible only in 
relation to the whole. In modern cosmology this 
is manifested through a perception that the large-
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scale structure of the universe effectively controls 
all physically isolated objects through the sheer 
fact that necessary conditions are determined by 
the global cosmological parameters (an example 
of such a conceptual causation is the famous 
anthropic principle in cosmology linking the 
necessary conditions of the biological life on 
this planet with the large-scale parameters of 
the universe). This is not empirical material 
knowledge, but the representation of the 
wholeness of the universe as related to its parts. 
As a purpose and hence as a potential end, the 
“thing” must be understood with reference to an 
idea determining a priori all that is to be contained 
in it. With respect to the whole of the universe it is 
impossible a priori to determine all its contingent 
components. However, the theoretical hypothesis 
that all its contingent components originate in the 
idiosyncratic singular state called “Big Bang” 
(in conjunction with the various versions of the 
so called “Theories of Everything”) attempts to 
represent the universe a-priori as the potentiality 
of everything. Such a definition is usually made 
in the form of mathematics, which is devoid of 
any intuitive content (for this definition is hardly 
to be related to the world of experience); it is 
constructed on the trans-logical premise of the 
universal validity of intuition-free mathematics. 
This is also true with respect to the theories of 
multiverse which extend the idea of a unique 
singular state to the underlying ensemble of 
universes, similar to the perennial idea of the 
plurality of worlds. The above mentioned trans-
logical premise corresponds to what Kant would 
describe as an attempt to establish accordance 
between the contingent things in the universe with 
our judgement in terms of necessity. To achieve 
this we must “think of another understanding, by 
reference to which and apart from any purpose 
ascribed to it, we may represent as necessary that 
accordance of natural laws with our judgement, 
which for our understanding is only thinkable 
through the medium of purposes” (CJ, § 77, p. 255) 
(emphasis added). The “another understanding” 
is that transcendent “subject” which contains as 
its intentional correlate the idea of the multiverse. 
Cosmology wants to assert the multiverse as that 
necessary foundation of this contingent world, 
where the contingency is related to the fact that 
this world is just one among the infinite many 
others. 
Interestingly, the idea of the Big Bang, as 
an initial state of the universe, that is the non-
originary origin of the universe (that is its remote 
past) effectively contributes to an argument of 
why the universe as a whole can be attributed the 
title of the purpose of explanation. If one uses 
the Kantian phrasing, the universe has parts that 
“combine in the unity of a whole such that they 
are reciprocally cause and effect of each other’s 
form” (CJ, § 65, p. 220). Cosmology treats the 
Big Bang to be the cause of the visible universe, 
where this visible universe becomes an “effect” 
of the Big Bang. However, in cosmological 
knowledge as a process of purposive human 
action, it is the display in the visible universe that 
initiates the theoretical ascent to the notion of the 
Big Bang as the unifying origin of the variety 
of the visible. In this sense the Big Bang can be 
treated as an explanatory effect of integration 
of the visible universe in the whole system. It 
is then not surprising that the Big Bang, as the 
purpose of cosmological explanation becomes 
its efficacious telos. In the case where we seek 
to estimate the universe’s causal dependence 
in such teleological forms, we are constructing 
the nexus of efficient causes productive of the 
universe’s form – that is, the Big Bang – as the 
concept which is not the constitutive concept of 
the understanding and reason, but a regulative 
concept for the reflective judgement in order to 
guide our investigation of the universe (cf. CJ, 
§ 65, p. 222).15 A similar situation concerns any 
knowledge: every empirical cognitive judgement 
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assumes the objectivity of determining concepts 
and laws which fit in a logical system. Such 
cognitive judgements consider their objects 
hypothetically as purposive, that is, as the 
purpose of explanation; their objects are products 
of intentional actions (their intentional correlates), 
without assuming that they are artefacts (that is 
material creations). 
The explicability  
of the universe as its telos
As we have discussed above, the reflective 
judgment, unlike the understanding and reason, 
can conceptualize any “particular” which escapes 
exhaustion by its discursive signifiers. This can 
be done either under the principle of mechanistic 
explanation or under the principle of teleology. 
Kant stipulates that this point involves a principle 
of reflection, which in a contemporary language 
can be qualified as a principle of explicability: 
“…for all things in nature empirical concepts can 
be found” (FI, V(211), p. 16). In other words, there 
is a correspondence between the universe and our 
understanding of it: there must be in the universe 
the conditions of its explicability. This means that 
one can reflect upon any object in the universe as 
organized in a sense that it is fit for knowledge 
by human beings. It is this purposiveness of the 
universe for being known, that is the adoption 
of a teleology as being hidden in the foundation 
of any knowledge, that encourages further 
investigation of the universe along the lines of 
efficient causality implanted in physical laws. The 
physical laws are applicable in cosmology only 
as being ordained by its intrinsic teleology, that 
is the teleology of explanation: one must apply 
empirical physical laws in order to understand the 
foundation of the visible universe. The strategy 
of cosmological research presupposes that either 
one of its parts, that is, that which estimates the 
universe teleologically, as an ultimate goal of 
explanation, and that part which estimates it, 
so to speak, “mechanically” (in order to fulfil 
the intention of having a systematic unity of the 
universe) are related to each other (Cf. CJ, § 77, 
p. 258). 
If teleology ordains a “mechanical part” 
of explanation in cosmology, there must be 
epistemological assurance that the laws will 
be found, which fulfil the task of mechanistic 
explanation. Kant’s attempt of such an assurance 
involved viewing nature as a whole on analogy 
with organisms as self-preserving: the affinities 
between species and members of species are 
provided through principles of preservation. 
One can extend this conjecture by introducing 
a principle of preservation of self-identity of 
persons in the course of their life from birth to 
adulthood and death. And it is this self-identity 
which is the ultimate purpose in understanding 
the uniqueness of a person. The explicability of the 
uniqueness of a person is driven by the desire for 
explicability of its unique origin, that is birth. This 
explicability presupposes a form of logic which is 
preserved in the course of life. Cosmology in turn 
presupposes that the contingent laws of nature 
have analogous affinities to their non-originary 
origin, and this affinity is provided by the logic 
of mathematical physics. The universe is to be 
estimated as a system of empirical laws in which 
the kinship relations are seen as holding between 
those propositions we produce in order to obtain 
understanding of the empirical which contains 
us: by understanding nature we understand 
ourselves. Kant, by developing the analogy 
between kinship of properties preserving life 
and the integrity of properties preserving nature, 
emphatically states: “Therefore it is a subjectively 
necessary, transcendental presupposition that 
this dismaying, unlimited diversity of empirical 
laws and this heterogeneity of natural forms 
does not belong in nature, that, instead, nature 
is fitted for experience as an empirical system 
through the affinity of particular laws under more 
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general ones. This presupposition is, then, the 
transcendental principle of the faculty of judgment, 
which is not simply a capacity of subsuming the 
particular under the universal whose concepts 
are given, but also the converse, of finding the 
universal for the particular.” (FI, IV(209), p. 14-
15). Continuing this thought, one can add that 
indeed the explication of the contingent variety 
of empirical laws and phenomena in the universe 
implies a transcendental principle of the faculty 
of judgment of finding the universal (Big Bang) 
for the particular (aspects of the visible universe 
extended in space and time) and this is analogous 
to finding the universal (the event of birth) for the 
particular (aspects of person’s life extended in 
time) in the context of human personhood. 
The latter quote from Kant, in the preceding 
paragraph, can be translated in the context of 
this enquiry as a principle which makes research 
strategies in cosmology intelligible and not as 
a metaphysical claim about the universe: in 
cosmology we are not subsuming all particular 
astrophysical discoveries under the known 
universal laws (we are not simply describing 
galaxies, their clusters or the microwave 
background radiation in terms of the laws of 
physics established on Earth as if these entities 
would be disjoint from each other); vice versa 
the universe as a whole is that universal which is 
being found for the particulars (all astrophysical 
objects in the universe are related to each other, 
for example, through their common evolution). 
It is this transcendental principle of the faculty 
of judgement which alone makes possible the 
explication of the universe as a whole. Whereas 
Kant employs an idea of affinity of laws for 
one another by referring to the analogy with 
the life-preserving properties of organisms 
which provide stability both for the species 
and for the individuals, in cosmology one can 
correspondingly talk of stability of properties 
of things and of forces that hold astrophysical 
entities together which are subjectively assured 
by the principle of affinity (galaxies and clusters 
of galaxies are held by the affinity to the law of 
gravitation16), which ultimately expresses the 
unity of the universe. 
As a matter of methodological comparison 
with Kant’s example of the inductive generation of 
the law of universal gravitation (CPuR, A662-63/
B690-91) one can point towards a construction of 
a scenario of the so called inflationary cosmology. 
As we have mentioned above, historically, the 
emergence of inflationary cosmology is usually 
accounted as a response to three meta-empirical 
problems (puzzles) in the standard hot Big Bang 
cosmology. They did not appear as a result of 
formal disagreements on the level of theory and 
observations and by its origin they are not due 
to physical causation among the elements of 
theory and observations but rather represent the 
influence of the intentional motives originating in 
the integrating tendencies of human subjectivity 
to account for the contingent facticity of the initial 
conditions in the universe. Before the advance 
of the inflationary model in the 1980s it was 
believed that the problem of the initial conditions 
of the universe needed a quantum description. 
The discovery that one can use classical gravity 
to address the problem of the initial conditions 
made the whole theory less speculative and in 
this sense “realistic”. Thus, the three problems (or 
puzzles) which led to the advance of inflationary 
cosmology are known as the flatness puzzle, the 
monopole problem and the horizon problem. 
Seen at the meta-empirical level these problems 
(flatness, monopoles and horizon) originate from 
different angles of view of the universe and 
thus have a different weight in the inflationary 
argument which attempts to resolve them. 
Without going into detail one can state that under 
the assumption that all these problems exhibit 
affinity to the same laws of physics, there was 
made a hypothetical suggestion that all problems 
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can be resolved if the general law of expansion 
of the universe were to be exponential in time. 
Correspondingly the overall substance of the 
universe is thought as an indefinite field (called 
“inflaton”) which, as we mentioned above, at this 
stage of research does not have any experimental 
references. Thus, using the Kantian language, 
the universals, like the inflaton field, which is 
responsible for another universal – the exponential 
geometric expansion – were introduced in order 
to subsume “recalcitrant particulars” (Cf. Butts 
1990) (that is three cosmological puzzles). 
Exponential expansion of the universe is treated 
as the “natural kind” that establishes affinities 
between the kinds of meta-empirical puzzles, 
thus providing unification of otherwise unrelated 
sorts of observed phenomena. In analogy with the 
Kantian appeal to the principle of affinity which 
discovers “…a unity in the generic forms of the 
orbits, and thereby a unity in the cause of all the 
laws of planetary motion, namely, gravitation” 
the assumption of inductive affinities in the 
standard cosmological model which conciliates 
otherwise disparate and unrelated facts (three 
problems) discovers (predicts) the law of the 
exponential expansion of the universe. What 
is important here is that there is a teleological 
commitment implanted in the whole history of 
construction of inflationary cosmology related 
to the desire to explicate the unity of otherwise 
disjoint aspects of the universe. It is this sought 
unity (as well as desire to construct generic 
initial condition in the universe which remove the 
problem of their contingency) which becomes a 
telos of explanation in inflationary cosmology, so 
that the implicit teleology ordains the usage of the 
“mechanistic-like” trends (that is causal physical 
dynamics) for explication of this sought unity 
thus producing a physic-mathematical model of 
the inflationary universe. 
Another important aspect of Kant’s 
explication of the function of reflective judgment 
in science is that is requires the presupposition 
that the universe’s empirical laws are related in 
the form of a deductive system, that is, the laws 
discovered on the assumption of inductive affinity 
also form a deductive hierarchy ranging from most 
to least general propositions (in contemporary 
usage this would amount to the assertion that 
empirical laws have their mathematical doubles 
organised in structures). The unity of natural 
kinds (empirical objects like galaxies and their 
clusters) is preserved by inductive affinity; 
the unity of the truth of the system of laws is 
preserved by deductive logic (unfolding from 
the mathematical hierarchy underlying physical 
laws). It is not a matter of theoretical knowing 
that entitles us to think that nature forms a set of 
inductively and deductively interrelated empirical 
laws; for knowledge itself it is possible because 
of the underlying correspondence between 
inductive affinity and deductive hierarchy. Both 
“mechanistic-like” explanation, or teleological 
pattern of reasoning do co-exist with no serious 
contradiction. In both cases, in order for human 
patterns of judgment to be possible at all, the 
whole of the universe must be treated as being 
“designed” in a very special sense (related to 
what has been said above): the correspondence 
between inductive affinities of empirical laws and 
deductive patters of mathematical explanations is 
the manifestation that the universe can be treated 
as being produced in order to become explicable. 
The principle of the universe’s explicability, 
being a transcendental delimiter in knowledge 
of the universe, thus reveals itself as that hidden 
telos of cosmological explanation, from which all 
cosmological theories receive their theoretical 
content. The telos of research is to explain the 
universe.
As a result of our deliberations we can 
see that the maxims of teleology and of the 
mechanism initiate different stances with 
respect to research in cosmology which turn out 
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ultimately to be intertwined. Our intention was 
to show that human faculties of judgment cannot 
operate without teleological commitments, and 
that, even though mechanistic-like explanations 
promote the interests of categorical knowing 
and make possible knowledge of nature “in the 
true sense”, that is knowledge in mathematical 
physics, the maxim of the mechanism is ordained 
by the active telos of cosmological explanation 
related to its explicability. 
Let us now elucidate the point of constructing 
the concept of the universe as a purpose of 
explanation of nature in general. According to 
Kant those things which are considered to be 
possible only as purposes of nature provide the 
“best proof of the contingency of the world-whole” 
(CJ, § 75, p. 246). The universe as a whole, taken 
to be the purpose of our quest, and found by us in 
the given form of the visible universe, could have 
been otherwise. Modern cosmology understands 
that this is the problem and attempts to escape the 
contingency of the universe (and hence the design-
like pattern of its explanation) by constructing the 
most generic initial conditions which would follow 
from the immanent physics (See Albrecht, 2003). 
Sometimes the initial conditions are replaced by 
the “boundary” conditions, or, more precise, by 
a form of the dependency upon “natural” laws 
enacted by or in the so called Multiverse – a new 
version of “intelligent and extramundane” being 
which operates as a designer of our universe. 
This move of thought definitely does not mean 
that we can have cognitive access to such a 
being. It is conceptually impossible for us as 
human knowers to conceive of the possibility 
of an ordered universe (its so called fine tuning) 
without also conceiving of it as designed (that 
is ordered or fine-tuned), and, as result where is 
design there is a designer. However, Kant insists 
that “we can form absolutely no concept of the 
possibility” (CJ, § 75, p. 246) of such a designer. 
Human beings either construe their reflective 
commitment to a designer of the universe as 
involving facts about human cognitive capacities, 
thus upon psychological laws (which manifests 
the contingency of the intelligibility as such), or 
they construe on the basis of the tautology that 
thinking of design is logically also thinking 
of designers (this corresponds to the natural 
attitude, when designer is thought as something 
extraneous to the facticity of the universe and 
consciousness). When the conceptual item of the 
ground of the universe’s facticity (or an idea of 
extended reality of that who “orders” the universe) 
extends human thought beyond the limits of 
possible experience, theoretical knowledge 
becomes impossible, and one must look to the 
special conditions that adjust our thought to fit 
this idea. The understanding is not precisely 
suitable for this purpose, for it determines 
(through application of the categories) only those 
particulars that are given in the sensible intuition. 
Judgment, however, requires that all (not only 
given) particulars are subject to understanding, 
that they can be kept intelligible and explicable 
under some law. In respect to the universe, our 
limited cognitive capacity makes it impossible 
for us to fulfil the demands of judgment in any 
theoretical way: knowledge remains apophatic, 
that is incapable of exhausting the reality of that 
which it signifies in terms of signifiers alone (See 
Nesteruk 2012[2]). In spite of this we are able to 
think (within the demands of mathematics) that 
the universe is organized so that we will be able 
to understand it. This presumption, or better, a 
certain belief-based commitment, establishes 
the intrinsic teleology of research: the research 
aims towards its telos, that is the allegedly 
objective pole of the concept of the universe as 
a whole (theoretically explicated, for example, 
in the idea of the Big Bang as its encapsulated 
origin). However, in order for this thought to 
be fully coherent, we must also presuppose 
(again as a matter of logic), the possibility of an 
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understanding which is different from our own, an 
intuitive understanding for which all particulars 
and all individuals, including the universe as a 
whole, are given at once. This understanding 
either proceeds from the theological teaching 
on the creatio ex nihilo (the universe is created 
by the Logos and through it) or, alternatively, as 
an infinite compendium of the universes with all 
possible logically admissible structures which 
can sustain universes, including that one of ours 
(the concept of the multiverse is implied here). 
This understanding (an intelligent designer of 
the universe or multiverse) then stands as the 
rational ground of our (God-given) expectation 
that the universe as a whole (the infinite) can 
be captured by our (limited, that is, finite) form 
of understanding (CJ, § 77, p. 255). According 
to Kant, the metaphysical infinitude of human 
beings proceeds from the awareness of our 
practical rationality which inherently transcends 
all that is available to our senses. We are left with 
a sense of admiration and awe, focused on our 
own rational agency and its freely created moral 
law. This is how we, finite beings, ‘feel’ about 
the metaphysical aspect of our infinitude. The 
question is: how to link the sense of metaphysical 
infinitude, having a practical character, with our 
epistemological limitedness related to our finitude 
in space and time (Moore 1992, 2001).
Here, together with Kant, we need to invoke 
the representation of the will. According to one 
of his formulations of the moral law: “Act as if 
the maxim of thy action were to become by thy 
will a universal law of nature” (FPMM, 48, p. 
39) (emphasis added). In spite of the fact that the 
scientific action is not exactly related to the moral 
one, the urge to conduct research with the aim 
of disclosing the unity of nature in the concept 
of the universe as a whole, is something which 
originates in human will (it is not a necessity 
which is subordinated to the biological order of 
existence). One can say, it originates in man’s 
desire to imitate in themselves the divine image 
which aspires to avoid any circumscription of 
humanity to physical nature and to “create” nature 
according to the human will exercised in a God-
like fashion. And it is this will, realised in posing 
the telos of cosmological explanation – the unity 
of all in all, or the Big Bang – which ordains reason 
for exercising all possible mechanistic patters of 
explanations to asymptotically approach it goal. 
To amplify the point discussed above, one 
must stress that the affinity between human 
understanding and the unexamined aspects of 
the universe can only be either an inductive or 
a logical connection between propositions (laws). 
But the expectation of a unified systematic nature 
cannot be realized by means of either induction or 
deductive logic (indeed we cannot accomplish this 
synthesis). Instead, it is only on the presupposition 
either of a designer of the universe or our extended 
cognitive God-given abilities (divine image) 
that we can trust induction, and that we can 
anticipate the application of logic as the form of 
organization of empirical laws of nature. There is 
a hidden purposiveness related to the explication 
of the very possibility of this knowledge. The 
postulation of understanding that is capable of 
a God’s-eye-view cannot be viewed as any kind 
of comprehension of a being actually possessing 
intuitive understanding and the capacity to create 
an ordered universe. The concept of a designer is 
in this sense replaceable by the regulative idea of 
an ordered universe in principle always accessible 
to human comprehension. The postulation of a 
designer of the universe thus amounts to nothing 
more than rational acceptance of an assumption 
about the systematic order of nature and the 
affinity between our cognitive capacities and 
that nature (expressed in the transcendental 
conditions of knowledge). Finally it is not 
difficult to comprehend that Kant’s argument in 
§ 78 of Critique of Judgement that the principle 
of mechanistic explanation must always be 
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subordinated to the principle of teleology 
becomes seen, in the context of cosmology, as 
something which goes without saying: indeed the 
judgement of the existence of the universe and its 
unity initiates the cosmological research which 
attempts to tackle the object corresponding to 
this concept discursively, along with the lines of 
mathematical-physical explanation. 
If either teleological or mechanistic-like 
explanation were to be applied in disjunction with 
each other, they could be seen to be “competing” 
explanations each excluding the other. However, 
understood as principles related to the overall 
intelligibility and explicability of the universe, 
they can be employed in harmony when one 
complements the other. What is meant here is 
that even the mechanical investigation of the 
phenomenal world as the only methodology for 
the production of positive theoretical knowledge 
presupposes the continuing ability of human 
understanding to uncover the secrets of the 
universe in the form of laws. In other words, the 
intelligibility of the universe is postulated on 
the basis of a rationality which in its practical 
function manifests itself as the transcendental 
conditions of explicability. By arguing that the 
methodology of cosmology based in mathematical 
physics is subordinated to the intrinsic teleology 
of explanation, we, together with Kant, are not 
urging that the maxim of teleology is more basic 
than the maxim of mechanism. That conclusion 
would be inappropriate because it is impossible 
to know beforehand whether this particular 
research strategy is more successful than another: 
the justification of the rules of investigation 
is grounded in research practice. Success in 
generating physical theories in cosmology is the 
test of those methodological programs which are 
drawn from the telos of explanation, that is the 
universe as a whole. In addition to this, the maxim 
of teleology holds only with respect to the process 
of investigation but not to its result. To think that 
this maxim is related to the physical referents 
per se would be equivalent to understanding 
that the entire body of empirical laws is to be 
judged to be an organism with visible or invisible 
ends (in the style of Plato); but this has no 
justification whatsoever. Indeed if the teleology 
of cosmological explanation were to be wrongly 
associated with some remote physical reference 
in the future, that is, as if cosmology is destined 
to disclose the goal of the universe’s evolution in 
the future, the whole novelty of our claim for the 
Big Bang as a telos of cosmological explanation 
would be obscured. Teleology is efficacious in the 
process of investigation of the universe because 
this teleology originates from within humanity 
which, being desperate to disclose the sense of 
its own existence, “humanizes” the universe, 
becoming not simply microcosm, but rather 
“macro-anthropos” (the humanisation of the 
universe is sometimes described as a continuous 
embodiment of humanity in the universe). 
Following the telos of cosmological explanation 
in research, humanity does not loose itself in 
the process of articulation of the universe. This 
articulated universe does not “swallow” humanity 
as its infinitesimal part. Humanity remains what 
it is, being affected by cosmology only in that 
the wonder and anxiety of its existence in the 
universe becomes more expressive. The goal in the 
cosmological explanation proceeds not from the 
universe as such, but from that humanly inferred 
aspiration to order the process of knowledge 
towards the explication of the human condition. 
In this sense the present teleology of cosmological 
explanation, in agreement with Kant, does not 
abandon the crucial epistemological standing 
of the mechanistic methodology in actual 
cosmological research, and it is the efficacy of 
teleology which generates new discoveries and 
theories of the universe through employment 
of the formalism of space and time, as well as 
the categories of the phenomenal world. In this 
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sense cosmology as such does not manifest any 
teleological laws of the universe; all particular 
cosmic phenomena are subject to empirical 
laws as expressions of causal mechanisms. 
Correspondingly when Kant writes at the end of 
$ 78, of Critique of Judgement that in spite of the 
necessity to explain all products and occurrences 
in nature by the principle of a mechanism, he 
admits that there are things “which we cannot even 
state for investigation except under the concept 
of a purpose of Reason” (CJ, p. 197) and these 
things “must, in conformity with the essential 
constitution of our Reason…be subordinated 
by us finally to causality in accordance with 
purposes.” (Ibid), we must understand this 
teleological principle in application to cosmology 
as being, not the maxim of teleology related to the 
material pole of the universe (as organism), but 
as the presuppositional principle guaranteeing 
that human understanding is fit for making the 
phenomenal world intelligible in order to explicate 
the sense of humanity’s existence. The principle 
of teleology of explanation in cosmology, which 
originates in the contemplation of purposiveness 
in the very fact of human existence, reveals 
itself as more general than either the maxim of 
mechanism, or of teleology understood in an old-
fashioned matter-referred style. The purposiveness 
of human actions as related to their underlying 
condition, which is imbued with will, becomes 
that decisive tool which makes discoveries and 
generates the laws of the universe.
Human purposive action (as a living process 
directed to the future) intends toward discovery 
of the laws of nature as unified in a single system 
which includes the “laws” of existence of human 
beings. In cosmology this single system of laws 
finds its completion in the idea of the Big Bang 
as the originary undifferentiated state of matter 
potentially containing “all in all” which is implied 
by the explanation. Seemingly paradoxical, 
however, this alleged “end” of explanation, 
in fact, lies in the past, that is in the temporal 
beginning of the universe, not its unknown end. 
The fact that this alleged “end” of explanation, is, 
in fact, at the limits of human comprehension, its 
infinite task, as Husserl would say, makes it quite 
clear that this “end” is not the universal Law of 
Nature which would be treated as a work of the 
transcendent creator. This “end” of explanation 
is the constituted end, within the transcendental 
limits related to human embodiment as the 
network of communicating observers.
Kant criticised the idea of the world, and he 
would be even more critical of attempts to create a 
construct of the universe as a whole. In this sense 
his transition from the Critique of Pure Reason to 
Critique of Judgment was a certain redirecting of 
one’s attention away from the universe per se, to 
the ways by means of which one can make some 
versions of the universe. One can conjecture that 
in insisting that there is no sense of talking in 
terms of positive certitudes about the universe as 
a whole, Kant would encourage us to explicate 
the underlying motives and methods of thinking 
of the world. Contemporary cosmology in this 
sense represents a complex story about what is 
observed, quantified, measured, calculated and 
extrapolated. A story which contains in itself 
the predispositions to its own effectively endless 
hermeneutics. Since the storytellers are scientists, 
the question about the truth of this story cannot be 
answered, by definition, for this story as such is the 
explication of the question itself. Correspondingly 
the questions of teleology in cosmology become 
matters not of any trans-experiential convictions, 
but matters of trust and confidence in the ability 
of humanity to understand the meaning of its 
existence in the universe. Finally, teleology 
implanted in the very human condition as a 
predisposition to knowing the universe retains 
humanity in a state of apprehensiveness and 
uncertainty stemming from human capabilities 
not only in trying to know, but in trying to live 
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(as expressed before in different words, humanity 
by its mysterious, God-given ability to articulate 
the whole universe, is still capable of retaining its 
own transcendence with respect to the universe, 
to be different from it and thus not “crushed 
under the number of astronomical facts” (Marcel 
1940, p. 32)). 
Examples of formal purposiveness  
in cosmology
At the beginning of § 10 of Critique of 
Judgment Kant describes what he means by 
‘purpose’ and ‘purposiveness’ in following terms: 
“If we wish to explain what a purpose is according 
to its transcendental determinations (. . .), [we say 
that] the purpose is the object of a concept, in so 
far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the 
object (the real ground of its possibility); and the 
causality of a concept in respect of its object is 
its purposiveness ( forma finalis).” (CJ, pp. 54-55). 
Here the relation of purposiveness is the relation 
between the concept of an object and this object; 
this relation occurs when the concept is one of the 
causes of the object. An object is to be considered 
as a purpose when the concept of this object can 
be counted as one of the causes of this object, that 
is, as part of the grounds of its possibility. In the 
Introduction IV, however, immediately after what 
is effectively stated above, Kant also uses the 
term purposiveness in a second sense, namely, 
for the characterization of the formal property of 
an object which necessarily has to be considered 
as a purpose: “…the agreement of a thing with 
that constitution of things which is only possible 
according to purposes [that is concepts as above, 
AN] is called the purposiveness of its form.” (CJ, 
p. 17). 
The concept of an object is one of the causes 
of the actual existence of this object when, firstly, 
a rational person has with intent brought about 
this object. In cosmology the concept of the Big 
Bang was brought into existence through the 
intent of cosmologists to explain the origin of the 
observed contingent facticity of the cosmological 
display. It certainly does not entail the existence 
of the Big Bang in the same sense as physical 
objects. Still the very existence of the Big Bang 
as an object of theoretical research is based in its 
concept which was brought into science through 
the human intent. Correspondingly the will of a 
cosmologist acting through using mathematical 
physics is motivated by the desire to explicate its 
own origin. This desire is the foundation-stone 
for the appearance of the concept of the Big Bang 
as an object of research. A cosmologist’s will is 
determined by the concept of the Big Bang when 
this person tries to bring this object into existence, 
moved by a desire to have the object which is 
conceived under that concept as physically real. 
In accordance with Kant one can assert that the 
concept of the Big Bang by means of which the 
will of a cosmologist is causal (with respect to 
its possible material pole) is the representation of 
the purpose. (Cf. CJ, § 10, p. 55). The concept of 
the Big Bang can then be one of the causes of its 
constituted existence when it is a representation 
of a purpose (the purpose to unite the manifold of 
the astronomical display in the single whole). 
One must notice that Kant’s use of the term 
‘purposiveness’ diverges from its ordinary use: 
for in the latter case the term tends to be applied 
only when the means to the end is a material 
object or causal event and not when it is a 
conceptual representation determining the will 
of a person. For a rational person the concept of 
an object can be the representation of a purpose 
only if this person has a reason to desire the 
actual existence of this object. For Kant this 
takes place if the person considers the object to 
be pleasant, useful or morally good; for us this 
means that the intended Big Bang is the “object” 
which unites all appearances and aspects of life 
in a logical system as its ultimate origin. If we 
would consider an object of pleasure as existing 
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in the world of appearances, it could only be 
considered as an actual purpose if it were to be 
an artefact. This is definitely not the case of the 
Big Bang in cosmology, for the Big Bang, as an 
intended object, can not be recognised in virtue 
of the actual history of its origination, for exactly 
this history is hidden from us: the history of the 
Big Bang’s origination is unknown – it is not a 
human artefact. Certainly there is a reason for a 
cosmologist to desire the actual existence of the 
Big Bang on the grounds of intended search for 
the foundations of the facticity of all. But in no 
way is the production of such an “object”, that 
is its accomplished theoretical construction, at 
all possible for human beings because not only 
do they not have a sufficiently exact conceptual 
representation of it, but they cannot control the 
ways and means which are appropriate for its 
“production” once and for all. One can assert 
with “negative certainty”, that the universe is not 
an artefact but “product” of nature (or whatever 
transcendent powers), whereas its intended unity 
(for example in a construct of the Big Bang) can be 
treated as an intelligible and never accomplished 
artefact.
According to Kant, judgments in which 
objects are judged to be actual or possible 
artefacts are those in which the representation 
of an object is combined with the representation 
of an actual or possible conceptual cause of 
the existence of this object. Kant is concerned 
not with such judgments, but above all with 
judgments about relations of purposiveness in 
which it is maintained that an object in the world 
of appearances is necessarily to be considered as 
a purpose or an artefact, because human beings 
can explain its possibility only by having recourse 
to a conceptual cause. Such an object is not an 
artefact, it is not an object that has been or even 
could be produced by a person according to rules-
however paradoxical this might at first appear: 
“But an object, or state of mind, or even an action 
is called purposive, although its possibility does 
not necessarily presuppose the representation of 
a purpose, merely because its possibility can be 
explained and conceived by us only so far as we 
assume for its ground a causality according to 
purposes, i.e. in accordance with a will which has 
regulated it according to the representation of a 
certain rule” (CJ, § 10, p. 55) (emphasis added). 
Here one must take note of what Kant meant by 
the will: in the same paragraph he defines it as 
“the faculty of desire, so far as it is determinable 
to act only through concepts.” That the possibility 
of an object can not be explained or conceived 
(along with the line of efficient causality) means, 
that the object (Big Bang) can not be an artefact, 
that it can not be a product of the intentional act 
of a person, whose will was determined by the 
representation (for there is no representation 
of the Big Bang) of the object. For in order to 
intentionally produce an object a physicist has 
to be able to explain the possibility of the object 
according to laws of nature, that is, the physicist 
must know and be in control of the causes which 
can bring about the object. It is obvious that this 
is not possible in the case where the Big Bang is 
treated as a certain matter-pole of cosmological 
theory. The Big Bang, or the universe as a whole, 
cannot be artefacts in any possible sense because 
their implied definition run against the Kantian 
conviction that artefacts are the only objects 
whose possibility one can completely explain, 
“for we see into a thing completely only so far as 
we can make it in accordance with our concepts 
and bring it to completion” (CJ, § 68, p. 231). 
The universe as a whole, or the Big Bang, whose 
possibility humans cannot explain by means of 
laws of nature, but which are nevertheless treated 
as nature, cannot be considered as artefacts. One 
can conjecture that they are intelligible artefacts, 
which are unaccomplished. They are artefacts in 
the making, that is mental creations forever being 
constituted. Together with Kant one can judge 
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“objects” of this type to be purposive because they 
appear contingent in the light of the laws of nature, 
or, to be more precise they are contingent for they 
set up these laws (the universe as a whole as the 
integrity of its boundary conditions sets up the laws 
of nature) (Cf. CJ, § 75, p. 246). In the case of the 
universe as a whole one allows a generalisation, 
for the contingency of the universe is judged not 
with respect to the given laws of nature, but with 
respect to the fact that the laws of nature can 
be considered themselves to be contingent. The 
connection between the contingency of an object 
according to laws of nature and the judging of 
the object as purposive can be clarified in the 
following manner: a cosmologist to whom an 
“object”, that is the universe as a whole, appears 
contingent as transcending the natural laws (more 
precisely, setting these laws), but who does not 
want to renounce an explanation of its possibility 
through these natural laws, can attribute to the 
universe as a whole a relation to a conceptual 
cause in a hypothetical explanation (for example, 
the Big Bang hypotheses realised in different 
scenarios like those of Hawking, Penrose, or in 
the concept of the multiverse where the cause of 
the visible universe is positioned in the realm of 
intelligible forms similar to that of Plato17). This 
conceptual cause in the hypothetical explanation 
is that telos of cosmological explanation as the 
universe’s explicability.18 In this way hypothetical 
judgments about relations of purposiveness arise 
as hypothetical explanations of objects whose 
possibility would remain otherwise inexplicable. 
(The varied contingent facticity of the universe 
would not be explicable if one would not relate 
it hypothetically to its conceptual cause.) The 
purposive ness which is attributed to an object 
in such judgments Kant calls a “purposiveness 
without purpose”: “There can be, then, 
purposiveness without purpose, so far as we do 
not place the causes of this form in a will [that 
is in the faculty of desire which is determined to 
act only through concepts, AN], but yet can only 
make the explanation of its possibility intelligible 
to ourselves by deriving it from a will. Again, we 
are not always forced to regard what we observe 
(in respect of its possibility) from the point of 
view of reason. Thus we can at least observe a 
purposiveness according to form, without basing 
it on a purpose (as the material of the nexus 
finalis), and notice it in objects, although only 
by reflection.” (CJ, § 10, pp. 55-56) (emphasis 
added). “Without purpose” is the purposiveness 
which is attributed to an object in these judgments 
because the conceptual representation of the 
object (theory of the Big Bang) is not claimed to 
be one of its real causes. Kant emphasises that in 
these judgments, the cause of the object judged 
to be a purpose is not found in a human will (that 
is in the faculty of desire which is determined 
to act only through concepts), thus not in an 
intentional act of thinking, where intentionality 
is understood as directedness of consciousness 
towards a certain material object (Big Bang, for 
example). We observe in the object (the universe 
as a whole), whose possibility cannot be explained 
by natural laws, a purposiveness according to 
form, without however basing it on a purpose 
(such as the material of the nexus finalis; in our 
case the universe as a whole understood as an 
accomplished material object), but this is done 
not through intentional rational thinking, it is 
done by reflection. 
“Without purpose” is a purposiveness 
attributed to an object, although this is not an 
artefact, so that this is purposiveness “without an 
actual conceptual cause”. One can attribute to those 
“objects” in cosmology whose possibility cannot 
be explained by natural laws, a “purposiveness 
without purpose”, a hypothetical purposiveness. 
Kant conceives the judgments about relations 
of purposiveness in which a hypothetical 
purposiveness is attributed to objects in analogy 
with judgements of artefacts. But it should not be 
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overlooked that in the judgments of artefacts one 
attributes to an object a relation to a conceptual 
cause quite different to that which is attributed 
to an object in hypothetical judgments about 
relations of purposiveness: in a judgment about 
an artefact the judged object is connected as an 
effect with its concept according to the causal law, 
which is why these judgments are an expression 
of theoretical knowledge. In a hypothetical 
judgment about a relation of purposiveness, in 
contrast, an object whose possibility humans 
cannot explain by means of natural laws is 
connected only with a supposed conceptual 
cause (the Big Bang), and this connection does 
not take place according to the causal law, it does 
not have the status of objective determination. 
These judgments, according to Kant, do not 
belong to the judgments of theoretical knowledge 
which are concerned with the possibility of the 
existence of things under the laws of nature. They 
are, rather, judgments of the reflective faculty of 
judgment: “purposiveness according to form”, 
that is, hypothetical purposiveness, which can be 
noticed “in objects, although only by reflection” 
(CJ, § 10, p. 56). 
Cosmology in those theoretical models 
which pretend to “explain” the origin of the visible 
universe provides us with the situations which 
fall under the rubric of formal purposiveness just 
discussed. For example, there are two typical 
models which pretend to model a supposed 
conceptual cause of the visible universe either 
through an appeal to the 4-dimension Euclidian 
space (Hawking’s model), or an ensemble of 
all possible initial conditions for the universe 
(Penrose’s model). We argued elsewhere 
(Nesteruk, 2003, pp. 152-59, 167-77) that the 
connection between these conceptual causes and 
the visible universe does not take place according 
to the causal physical law, that is, it does not have 
the status of objective determination. Indeed, 
by introducing the conceptual causes its authors 
rather exercise the reflective faculty of judgement 
by manifesting the theoretical purposiveness 
through introducing the intelligible “objects” 
which aim to explicate the contingent facticity of 
the visible universe. This purposiveness is formal 
because there is no physical link between the 
intelligible and empirical unless in reflection and 
not through the causal law. Indeed, to “explain” 
the contingent variety of objects in the universe 
cosmology imitates an ancient Greek ideal of 
looking for substance (ousia), an undifferentiated 
and underlying something which contains in 
itself the potentiality for everything which is 
observable. Being a formal telos of explanation 
this substance manifests the attributes of the 
intelligible, hypothetical and “found only in 
reflection”. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the 
delimiters in the strategies of cosmological 
research which originate in the fact that all 
human actions (including scientific research) 
can be considered as purposive. In spite of a 
general tendency in science to dispense with 
teleology, we argued that due to the specificity 
of the subject matter in cosmology, its research 
goes on under the assumption that there is a goal 
of research, the motivational purpose, related 
to the explicability of the universe. This latter 
explicability originates in the human condition, 
that is in the human intentional search for the 
sense of its own existence in the universe. 
Thus the purpose of explanation in cosmology 
is related to the explication of the human 
condition. Correspondingly the purposiveness of 
cosmological research as its certain strategy acts 
as a delimiter in the explicability of the universe 
related to the human condition. The universe is 
being explicated in the conditions that the goal of 
this explication is formulated and followed not on 
the grounds of concepts of the reason, but on the 
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grounds of the faculty of reflective judgement. 
Here cosmology exhibits an example where both 
principles, namely that of teleology and that of 
the causal efficiency of the natural laws, work 
together. The telos of cosmological explanation 
then is that which is constantly constituted 
through the interplay of “mechanistic” and 
teleological principles. It is the anticipated 
purpose of explanation which ultimately ordains 
the advance of scientific cosmology. It was 
demonstrated that there are two basic concepts in 
modern cosmology related to each other, namely 
the universe as a whole and its encapsulated 
origin (the Big Bang) that act as the telos of 
cosmological research and explanation. The case 
of the Big Bang is particularly interesting in 
this respect for it gives an example of a reversed 
teleological temporality, for the alleged material 
pole of the telos of explanation is situated not in 
the future, but in the past of the universe. This 
result is not surprising in a phenomenological 
context, where the Big Bang would be treated 
as a noematic pole towards which intentionality 
aspires; but being an “object” of the kosmos 
noetikos and thus being to subject of laws of 
eidetic concatenation, the Big Bang is devo1id 
of any attributes of the physical temporality. Its 
functioning as a telos of explanation refers to the 
teleological essence of the cognising subject, its 
self-elucidation, that light of the reason struggling 
against self-forgetfulness which is brought by the 
cosmology in it “mechanistic” application, and in 
which thought would no longer recognise that it 
is the centre of the world. As was said once by E. 
Husserl, the supreme end of knowledge is to not 
forget. This is the meaning of that resistance to 
the thought of that which G. Marcel characterised 
as the crushing man under the weight of 
astronomical facts. To resist dissolution of the ego 
by the universe is the ultimate telos of humanity 
destined to transcend the limited boundaries of 
the created world. 
It is also briefly argued that all contemporary 
scenarios of the origin of the universe provide 
a common manifestation of the intrinsic 
purposiveness in explication of the universe: 
the appeal for the explanation of the contingent 
facticity of its visible counterpart to some 
intelligible entities which allegedly explain away 
this contingency. The invocation of intelligible 
entities in explanation of the origin of the universe 
becomes the manifestation of that maxim of 
teleology which is active in cosmology: to explain 
all contingent facticity of the visible universe by 
referring (allegedly through the natural laws) 
to the intelligible realm of the immutable and 
necessary mathematical laws. Summarising, 
there is an underlying maxim of teleology which 
is present in cosmological research which makes 
all strategies of explaining the contingent facticity 
of the observable universe similar by relating 
this facticity, through the logic of mathematical 
physics, to the intelligible models of the universe’ 
foundation, which all manifest the sought telos of 
cosmological explanation. 
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1 There are few papers which deal with the purposiveness of research in the context of the Kant’s third Critique. See, for 
example, (Butts, 1990), (Fricke, 1992), (Krichivets, 1996).
2 The asserted isotropy of the universe is not related to the universe at present but represents its non-local in time property 
because the observed clusters of galaxies are very distant objects so that we see only their past images. 
3 See a paper (Roush, 2003) where Copernicus’ position is carefully articulated. One should remember that, Nicolas of 
Cusa, on different grounds, also argued about the impossibility of asserting the centre of the world either inside the earth 
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or outside it. See in this respect (Koyré, 1958, 5-23). 
4 See an interesting discussion of this point in (Powell, 1935).
5 It was E. A. Milne who inaugurated (after Einstein’s suggestion) the principle that “all places in the universe are alike” as 
“the cosmological principle”. 
6 The concept of matter of the universe in relativistic cosmology is similar to the concept of ideal gas in which real physical 
particles are treated as point-like objects, material points. Any set of material points can be taken as prototype, which can 
be filled in with different meaning. For the ideal gas one can take a prototype of chaotic motion of material points and 
substitute molecules for these points. In cosmology, by substituting material points by clusters of galaxies one can obtain 
the notion of “matter of the universe” (See, for example, a classical text (Misner et al. 1973, 711-13)). 
7 See more on the discussion of the sufficient conditions for existence of life in (Nesteruk 2003, 200-208). 
8 Some recent research suggests that in spite of a mediocre position in space, there is a certain selectiveness in our presence 
in the universe in the present era, not only from the point of view of anthropic arguments related to the necessary temporal 
span in order to have chemical elements available for our bodies to form, but from the point of view of the dynamical 
proportions of the large-scale material constituents of the universe (dark energy, dark matter, visible matter) which allow 
for the large scale-structure to be observable at all. The major claims of this research is that in the future the universe will 
be so sparse, that its structure would not be seen and we could not make any conclusion of its evolution and origin in the 
Big Bang. (See, for example, (Krauss, Scherrer, 2008), (Krauss 2009), (Primack, Abrams, 2006, pp. 269-72)). 
9 Kant talks about the determinant faculty of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason (A130/B169ff.) The faculty of judg-
ment is the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a 
given rule (A132/B171). Thinking of a given particular as contained under a given universal means to subsume the repre-
sentation of the particular under the representation of the universal. 
10 See on coherence of epistemic justification in cosmology my papers (Nesteruk, 2011), as well as in references given 
therein. 
11 The bibliography on technical aspects of the inflationary cosmology is vast and I would like to give references only to two 
books (Penrose 2005) and (Weinberg 2008).
12 Both Penrose and Weinberg stress a point that the whole inflationary scenario is based on the assumption of the existence of 
a fundamental field, inflaton, whose quantum, the physical particle known as Higgs boson, has not been yet found experi-
mentally. Penrose while commenting on inflationary cosmology points that the introduction of a new field φ into “menag-
erie of known (and conjectured) physical particle/fields” was dictated solely by the desire to have an exponential expansion, 
so that no other physical motivation of relating this field to other known physical was established (Penrose 2005, p. 751). S. 
Weinberg on his side while commenting on the hypothetical predictions of eternal inflation about existence of many disjoint 
universes asserts that the validity of this idea “will probably have to come from progress in fundamental physics, which may 
verify the existence of a suitable inflation field, rather than from astronomical observation” (Weinberg 2008, p. 217). 
13 The fact that these puzzles are not empirical follows from the fact that there is no direct empirical predicament which could 
invoke these puzzles. They appear on the level of reflection while generalizing different aspects of physics, in particular, 
cosmology with the physics of elementary particles. 
14 Kant did not discuss, in his reflections on teleology in the Critique of Judgement, the universe as “the end of nature”, 
for the universe was treated by him, in his first Critique, as a rational idea, but not as an aesthetical or teleological idea. 
Correspondingly if one approaches the universe from the side of communion with it in an ancient Greek philosophical 
sense, that is the universe (cosmos) as a category of personal relationship with harmony and beauty, as work of art, then 
the universe represents an end in itself which demands judgement, rather than reason. In judging the form of the universe 
aesthetically, we are able to find, without presupposing a concept of the object which corresponds to this universe as a 
source of beauty and harmony, that certain things which are displayed in the universe are purposive (in the empirical 
apprehension of them in intuition) merely in relation to the subjective conditions of the power of judgment. Thus, when 
the Greeks judged the universe aesthetically, no concept of this universe as a spatio-temporal object was needed, nor was 
produced. Correspondingly, in cosmology, by judging the universe aesthetically, for example perceiving the universe as a 
subject of communion, we do not make an objective judgment and do not declare the universe as natural end (intentionally 
created for us to be bedazzled by it), but declare it to be purposive only in relation to the subject, namely, for their faculty 
of representation of the universe as beauty and harmony, as cosmos. 
15 If one thinks naturalistically, that is, treats the Big Bang as a material final cause of the universe, then it clashes with Kant’s 
view according to which only organisms satisfy the above mentioned conditions for being the ends of nature. However, 
despite of his remark that organisms provide “objective reality” to the conception of an end of nature and allow us to 
distinguish such ends from merely practical ones, he insists that the idea of an end has no constitutive meaning, but only 
provides us with a rule for guiding investigation of organisms. Here one can point out that the ideas of the Big Bang as 
a non-originary origin of the universe can be paralleled in an organism-like fashion with the idea of birth of any human 
being as that phenomenologically hidden non-originary origin of any individual human life which acts as an “end” in 
itself, because the wholes sense of the human life originating in this event, is ultimately directed to the explication of that 
mystery of birth. (For more details see (Nesteruk 2008, pp. 247-54) and (Nesteruk 2012[1]).
16 There are some hypotheses, however, that the stability of galaxies, which is now accounted by reference to the so called 
dark matter, may be sustained by the laws of gravitation which deviate from the Newtonian one (to which Kant referred in 
his writings). If this would be true then the hypothesis of dark matter could be abolished. 
17 See the analysis of Hawking’s and Penrose’s hypotheses in (Nestreuk 2003, pp. 152-59, 167-77).
18 The universe, being an “object” of cosmology, could not be the lived fact, even if the constancy of a lived experience 
confers an experiential generality on it. However the universe can become a type of a “lived fact” proceeding from 
possible idealities in which the laws of eidetic concatenation warrant its rational representation and may be explication.
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Космология и телеология:  
целесообразность в исследовании вселенной  
в свете «Критики способности суждения» Канта
А.в. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута 
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг, ПОРТСМУТ, 
РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В этой статье мы продолжаем обсуждать ограничения в космологическом исследовании, 
проистекающие из природы познающего субъекта. В частности, какова природа ограничений, 
следующих из целесообразности, присущей человеческой деятельности. Затрагивая 
телеологическое измерение космологии, мы имеем в виду не традиционное представление о 
телеологии мира, связанное с его целенаправленным физическим развитием. Мы рассматриваем 
другую, выражаясь языком Канта, формальную целесообразность космологии, исходящую 
из представления о цели космологического исследования как экспликации Вселенной для 
самопрояснения и самоутверждения человека в ней. Телос космологического исследования 
оказывается соотнесенным с телосом антропологии как экспликации сущности человека. 
Именно этот телос служит ограничителем в выборе стратегий космологического 
исследования. Мы прослеживаем активное присутствие такого телоса в двух предельных 
космологических представлениях: Вселенной как целом и так называемом Большом Взрыве 
(начальном условии Вселенной), соотнося их с телосом антропологического объяснения начала 
человеческой личности в акте рождения. Историко-философским источником нашего анализа 
является «Критика способности суждения Канта», что достаточно ново в плане применения 
Кантовских идей к вопросам философии науки. В этом смысле наш анализ показывает 
непреходящую актуальность кантовских идей.
Ключевые слова: космология; телеология; суждение; целесообразность; выразимость; 
человечество.
